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Hog Daddy and the Walls of Steel: Catch Shares
and Ecosystem Change in the New England
Groundfishery
JENNIFER F. BREWER
Department of Geography, University of New Hampshire, Durham,
New Hampshire, USA
The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration implemented market-
based fishery management in the New England groundfishery as catch shares, con-
trolling aggregate harvests through tradable annual catch quotas allocated to fishing
groups called sectors. Policy supporters assert that resulting markets raise conser-
vation incentives. In compliance with the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act, species assessments permit catch shares to replace more spa-
tially and temporally specific constraints on fishing gear, time, areas, and daily har-
vest limits. Qualitative evidence from field interviews and participant observation
questions the efficacy of catch shares. Fishing industry members observe that
increased presence of large trawl vessels in previously protected areas damages fish
subpopulations and benthic habitat. Regulatory bioeconomic models fail to consider
these lay observations. The consequent inability of quota markets to recognize the
materiality of human–environment relationships at the spatiotemporal scales of
fishing activity, and to internalize associated externalities, may have devastating
consequences for the fishery.
Keywords benthic habitat, cod (Gadus morhua), environmental markets, fish
population dynamics, fishing gear impacts, Gulf of Maine, haddock (Melano-
grammus aeglefinus), LEK, Massachusetts, privatization
Commercial fisheries provided some of the earliest thought experiments for the
theoretical development of market-based solutions to environmental management
problems (Gordon 1953; Scott 1955). Since practical application initiated in the
1970s, single- and multicase reviews of market-based fishery management point
toward a series of ostensible successes, principally from the perspectives of aggregate
economic profits, target fish species, and governmental administration (National
Research Council 1999; Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). A parallel series of
studies finds that corresponding industry consolidation removes fishing-related
activities from historically involved communities (National Research Council 1999;
Copes and Charles 2004; U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO] 2004;
Pinkerton and Edwards 2010). Other authors question the purported causal link
between market mechanisms and growth in target fish populations, and point to
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ecological externalities such as impacts to nontarget fish populations and habitat
(Copes 1986; Gibbs 2010; Emery et al. 2012). These differences in perceived benefits
and risks also precipitate schisms within the fishing industry.
Despite these unsettled debates, leadership of the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) firmly embraced market-based fishery man-
agement in a 2009 national ‘‘catch share’’ policy and launched regional implemen-
tation efforts. The agency did so with encouragement and assistance from the
Environmental Defense Fund, which had been lobbying on the issue for almost
two decades (Environmental Defense Fund 1994; 2013). Following the 2006 lifting
of a 1996 Congressional moratorium on some catch share programs, one of the fish-
eries NOAA targeted for conversion to market-based management was the New
England groundfishery. Thus far, peer-reviewed and gray literature on the resulting
groundfish catch share program have focused mainly on an administrative inno-
vation whereby harvest shares were initially allocated to new management coopera-
tives called ‘‘sectors’’ instead of to individuals or firms in a more standard approach
(Carroll 2012). Some authors point to the potential of these sectors and associated
programs to ameliorate negative social and ecological impacts of quota markets,
such as with research collaboration, alternative fish marketing, and quota banks sup-
ported by nonprofit and public entities (Holland and Wiersma 2010; Brinson, Lee,
and Rountree 2011; Nature Conservancy 2011; Conathan 2012). In contrast, the
present article suggests that the creation of an environmental market for fishery
catch shares failed to consider spatiotemporal particularities of the socioecological
system. Qualitative evidence indicates changes in fishing practices and associated
ecosystem decline, observed by portions of the industry but thus far unaddressed
by management. It demonstrates that policy implementation has averted public rec-
ognition of lay knowledge produced at the nexus of place–time-specific material
interactions among fishing folk, fishing gear, and the marine environment.
Research Methods
Findings presented here are informed by field data collected since 1989, especially
between 2002–2012. Analysis followed a generalized grounded theory approach,
including textual and discourse analysis, data coding, countersampling, and iterative
extraction of categories, themes, and findings (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Glaser
1994). The most directly relevant data collection was completed in 2010–2013. This
included more than 20 hours of semistructured interviews with a combined snowball
and stratified sample of 16 people, of which 13 hours were audio recorded. The
aggregate fishing industry experience of these informants totals more than 300 years
and spans gear types, boat sizes, and home states. Data also included 5 days of par-
ticipant observation at seven public meetings, and 14 days of participant observation
at private meetings, including less structured conversations with at least 27 people,
10 involved in the New England groundfishery and 17 familiar with catch share
programs elsewhere. Interviews included present and past groundfishermen1 and
their families, sector managers, staff of nonprofit organizations, present and past
public officials, and scientists. Document review included hundreds of pages of
government documents, nonprofit group materials, and media reports. The study
draws less directly on additional structured and unstructured in-person interviews
and less formal conversations undertaken for prior studies. These include more than
300 fishing industry members, public servants, nongovernmental organization























(NGO) staff, scientists, and other coastal residents and professionals, sampled using
snowball and stratified strategies. Other background data sources include 85 mail
and phone survey responses from randomized samples of Maine fishermen; four
focus groups in eastern Maine; participant observation at more than 40 public
meetings and more than 50 nonpublic briefings, conferences, and project meetings
in New England, Washington, DC, North Carolina, and Alaska; and more than four
years of participant observation in marine resource management and policy arenas,
and around fishing-dependent villages, households, vessels, and other businesses.2
Markets and Fished Ecosystems
Catch shares and related market-based management innovations are increasingly
favored in fisheries policy worldwide (Beddington, Agnew, and Clark 2007; Costello,
Gaines, and Lynham 2008). Potential public benefits and costs are discussed
in numerous case studies, comparative analyses, and literature reviews (National
Research Council 1999; Copes and Charles 2004; U.S. GAO 2004; Gibbs 2010;
Emery et al. 2012; Grimm et al. 2012; The´baud, Innes, and Ellis 2012; Pinkerton
2013). Reported outcomes vary with a range of factors relating to life histories
and habitat of target and nontarget species, harvest technology, product markets,
capital access, firm ownership and investment, informal social institutions, govern-
ance arrangements, data availability, and study methods. Advocates assert that catch
shares create a ‘‘simpler and more efficient’’ management regime, eliminating the
need for controls on fishing inputs, such as fishing gear, times, areas, boat sizes,
and daily harvest totals, replacing these with economic incentives (Gulf of Maine
Research Institute 2008, 4; Conathan 2012). Government agencies distribute
as-yet-uncaught fish to fishing firms as quota, portions of the total allowable catch,
generally calculated in relation to past boat landings and renewed annually. To
accommodate normal variation and change in firm strategies and the marine ecosys-
tem, quota transfers transpire by sale and lease. Quota values often rise rapidly after
allocation, bringing windfall profits to initial recipients, and posing high barriers to
aspiring boat owners with limited capital. Subsequent capital investment and legal
takings provisions can prevent retraction of quota programs.
Biological models undergirding catch share implementation tend to neglect
socioecological heterogeneity, lacking spatiotemporally explicit consideration of
material interactions between humans and the marine environment (Clay 1996;
Wilson, Acheson, and Kleban 1996; Walters et al. 2005; St. Martin 2006; Hilborn
2011). Standardized fish population assessment techniques used to set total allow-
able catches focus on the manipulation of target species datasets, isolating the
execution of advanced statistical modeling work from routinized field data collection
activities (Larkin 1977; Rose 1997). Despite ongoing experiments in ecosystem-based
modeling, most assessments assume that present and future ratios of unharvested
species quantities to subsequent survival and reproduction rates are similar to past
ratios (Beddington, Agnew, and Clark 2007; cf. Christensen and Walters 2004; Tallis
et al. 2010; Link 2012). They therefore project allowable catches from historical
measures of fish populations and harvests. This seems logical as a mathematical
equation, but it overlooks the potential for deviation from historic norms in any
number of impinging variables. One cluster of overlooked variables involves oceano-
graphic and climatic factors, such as water quality and temperature. Another
involves other flora and fauna linked to target species through trophic or habitat























interactions. The third cluster, most relevant to the case presented here, involves the
how, where, and when of harvest activities, and associated impacts on fish survival
and reproduction. This is the most intensively material site of fishing activity as
human–marine interaction, the physical deployment of fishing technology. It is a site
at which fishermen continually produce local knowledge at a fine scale of spatial and
temporal specificity, observing innumerable variables pertinent to target species,
fishing gear, and surrounding species and habitat. Extensive research demonstrates
the potential utility of such local knowledge to management decision making
(Wilson, Acheson, and Kleban 1996; Degnbol 2005; Haggan, Neis, and Baird 2007;
Ruddle and Davis 2011).
NOAA social science capacity is growing (Abbott-Jamieson and Clay 2012)
and produces increasingly substantive economic and social impact analyses, but
per strictures of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA) these analyses have minimal influence on regulatory decisions. Several
underanalyzed variables are difficult to neatly quantify, but are directly relevant to
the present discussion. These include firm sizes and structures, capital access and
lending patterns, extensive fishing-related barter and kinship-dependent economies,
and informal institutions (e.g., New England Fishery Management Council and
National Marine Fisheries Service Northeast Fisheries Science Center 2003). Of
greatest immediate significance, assessments do not consider socioecological drivers
or implications of gear selection and deployment decisions aboard fishing boats.
Some consolidation of fishing fleets is virtually universal under most catch share
programs, despite any regulatory intentions (National Research Council 1999). This
affects shore-side infrastructure development, financial control of quota, spatial dis-
tributions of fishing-related income and activity, and vertical integration of harvest
and processing operations. A related risk remains virtually absent from the litera-
ture, and from public policy debates: the possibility that consolidated firms may
escalate harmful ecological impacts of fishing activities as they achieve economies
of scale. Attention to this possibility requires us to recognize two streams of ecologi-
cal literature, one pointing toward habitat impacts of some fishing gear, and one
investigating the spatiotemporal dynamics of fish populations.
Multiple studies document smoothing of rocky benthic contours by bottom-
tending fishing gear dragged behind boats, though it is less clear how such gear
affects flat, sandy, or muddy bottom (National Research Council 2002). Other stu-
dies indicate that some fish populations, including groundfish species such as cod
and haddock, comprise metapopulations (Reich and DeAlteris 2009; Skjæraasen
et al. 2011), with some studies drawing explicitly on spatiotemporally specific indus-
try observations (Bigelow 1924; Ames 2004). Subpopulations mix seasonally over
large areas, then home to segregated spawning aggregations, demonstrating peren-
nial site fidelity to shallow banks, rivermouths, or other features. Evolutionarily, this
reproductive pattern can facilitate site-specific adaptation of subpopulations to
highly local oceanographic conditions, and increase overall intraspecies genetic
diversity. Loss of this spatialized diversity can decrease overall survival rates of
juvenile fish, and increase species vulnerability to more generalized collapse (Kerr,
Cadrin, and Secor 2010; Zemeckis et al. 2012).
These ecological literatures and corresponding industry observations pose a
challenge to fishery managers, since gear impacts and metapopulations have not
been quantified with sufficient statistical rigor to integrate into federal stock assess-
ments, at least not convincingly enough to withstand courtroom scrutiny. Federal























law and ongoing environmental lawsuits focus scientific assessment efforts on high
levels of quantitative precision at the expense of empirical breadth (Walters et al.
2005; Longhurst 2010; Hilborn 2011). The groundfish case demonstrates how catch
shares can aggravate this imbalance and may thereby incur long-term ecological
damage.
The Fishery and Its Assessment
Groundfish are finfish living on or near the sea floor. In New England, commercially
valued species managed together in the multispecies complex include cod, haddock,
halibut, several flounders, pollock, hake, and redfish. Boats harvest groundfish with
otter trawls,3 heavy net gear dragged behind vessels from 40 to more than 100 ft long,
or with gillnets or hooks, which can be set from smaller boats. They are based in
harbors from Canada to the Mid-Atlantic states, including the largest ports of
New Bedford and Gloucester, Massachusetts, and Portland, Maine (see Figure 1).
Some firms own a few boats, and one in New Bedford owns 11, but most smaller
boats belong to owner-operators, many of whom grew up in multigenerational
fishing families.
Sustainable management of groundfish species has proven difficult. In the past,
environmental groups have sued NOAA for failing to manage the resource in
the public interest, and recent stock assessments indicate that the fishery is still
Figure 1. New England groundfishing region.























not meeting rebuilding timelines that were implemented by Congress in 2006 at
the urging of environmental groups. NOAA staff members establish biological
and administrative parameters to ensure legal and policy compliance, but normally
adopt regulations proposed by the New England Fishery Management Council, as
intended by the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(FCMA), the primary federal fisheries law. The council is a federal advisory body
including state fishery management agency designees and state-nominated, NOAA-
approved representatives, mostly fishing industry members.
In the last two years, groundfish population assessments and anecdotal evidence
indicate unprecedented population depletions simultaneous with the implementation
of catch shares. In spring 2012, federal species assessments virtually mandated that
portions of the fishery would shut down in the coming year. Following a mostly
positive prior assessment, finding that Gulf of Maine cod were not overfished, pend-
ing cuts to cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder quota reached or exceeded 70%,
with Gulf of Maine cod cuts reaching 90%. The remainder of this article lays out
one area of speculation about the cause of this crisis: a shift from more direct
and spatiotemporally specific regulatory controls on fishing effort to annual quotas
on harvest outputs.4 Admittedly, the present predicament is likely caused by some
constellation of drivers, not one alone. Nonetheless, given fervent beliefs expressed
by a significant portion of the industry, the concern seems plausible enough to merit
more serious public consideration than it has received thus far.
Shifting from Input to Output Controls
One of the ostensible benefits of market-based quota management from the perspec-
tive of economists, and some fishermen and managers, is that it weakens the case for
controls that focus on the day-to-day materiality of fishing activities, such as fishing
gear, time, daily catches, and boat size (Copes 1979; National Research Council
1999; Gulf of Maine Research Institute 2008; Conathan 2012). Assuming that stan-
dard fish population assessments calculate annual allowable catches accurately,
managers need not concern themselves much with where, when, or how harvest hap-
pens. Within relatively large spatial areas, such as Georges Bank, the Gulf of Maine,
or southern New England, one dead pound of fish is calculated as one dead pound of
fish, distinguished from others in the assessment mainly by estimated age and pre-
sumed reproductive capability. Particulars of fishing inputs such as gear technology,
boat size, and fishing schedules and locations become mostly irrelevant. This appar-
ent catch share benefit generally appeals to management agencies, believing they will
no longer need to monitor, adjust, and enforce a slew of regulations, but can simply
hold the industry to maximum annual output quotas. It also appeals to fishermen
when led to believe that quotas will eliminate the need for other regulations.
Accordingly, when the New England Fishery Management Council implemen-
ted groundfish catch shares at NOAA urging, it lifted restrictions on fishing time,
previously allocated as days-at-sea per boat per year. In recent years, the council
had altered the accounting of fishing time to discourage inshore fishing by counting
inshore days at a two-for-one ratio while offshore days remained as whole days.
In the same vein, the council eliminated seasonal area closures that had been in place
for more than a decade. These were called ‘‘rolling’’ closures because they closed and
reopened each spring in staggered increments along the coast from Massachusetts
to Maine. While ostensibly intended to simply reduce overall fishing mortality























as accounted for in fishery assessments, the closures roughly followed the spawning
schedules of key groundfish species as coastal waters warm seasonally from south-
west to northeast. Under catch shares, the council also eliminated limits on per-trip
species harvests, including cod limits that had ranged from 30 to 800 pounds per trip
over the last decade.5
Shortly thereafter, large boats started plying waters just a few miles from shore,
where closures and trip limits had previously deterred them. Fish populations were
more abundant inshore than offshore, fuel costs were lower, and suddenly boats
were allowed to fill their holds on each trip. NOAA confirmed for a reporter with
the Gloucester Times that in a selected 3-day period of fall 2012, eight vessels larger
than 70 ft were legally operating on Middle Bank, less than an hour’s steam from
Massachusetts harbors. The reporter also confirmed with a sector manager that their
large trawlers sometimes work inshore, though they spend the majority of their time
offshore. Repeated sightings from smaller inshore boats sufficiently concerned the
state’s Department of Marine Fisheries that the agency has repeatedly asked the
New England Fishery Management Council to curtail the new inshore effort, even
though most of the large vessels operate from Massachusetts ports and are owned
by Massachusetts constituents.
When they were in place, inshore area closures forced smaller boats to either cut
fishing time or risk crew lives in deeper waters than their vessels can safely navigate
in bad weather. Larger boats easily fished year-round in offshore waters beyond
the seasonal closed areas. They now see incentives to come inshore, especially for
cod, which aggregates inshore and generally brings good market prices at the dock.
One small-boat fisherman conveyed the scale and biological impact of increased
inshore effort:
We brought cod back. . . .The fish are only here because we had seven
months of rolling closures. We had trip limits as low as 30 pounds
a day . . .while these [bigger] guys were fishing 12 months a year . . . So
that’s changed a lot, with a lot of big draggers working where big
draggers never have been before. It’s not uncommon to see the whole
fleet of 90 foot draggers from Portland, Maine all the way to Gloucester
working five miles off the coast [here]. One day I counted 17 of them.
That had never, ever happened down here before. But it’s an incentive
for them . . . If they have 30,000 pounds to catch, why would they go
to Georges [Bank] to catch it if they can catch it right inshore here?
And they wouldn’t have been able to do that before when we had trip
limits of 1,500 pounds, 500 pounds. It wouldn’t have been worth it for
them to fish here. They would have gone to Georges to work . . . amongst
amongst other species. Instead they’re coming in here and catching
mostly just cod, and they can catch 30,000 pounds in a day or two.
Inshore Fish Populations
Many inshore fishermen believe they are witnessing detrimental impacts on fish
populations as a result of this spatiotemporal change in harvest patterns. Not only
does it concern them to observe that larger volumes of fish are being caught as they
aggregate to spawn, but mobile6 fishing gear also scatters uncaught fish, perhaps























interfering with spawning behavior. As one fisherman is fond of saying, ‘‘You might
have trouble performing too, if there was a bulldozer in your bedroom.’’ Larger
boats have more horsepower, can handle more gear, and can tow areas where the
gear of smaller trawlers would hang up and tear or risk capsizing the boat, especially
in winter seas. On marginal weather days, if worse weather is pending, larger boats
can now make shorter inshore trips, in a smaller window of time than a week-long
trip to Georges Bank. One interviewee noted the greater capabilities of larger boats:
On a day like today when it’s really blowing out, they don’t have to come
in; they can just keep on towing. They have enough power and stability to
just tow at a constant speed even in rough weather, whereas a little boat
just can’t do it. But I don’t think they’re supposed to use anything larger
than a 12 inch rockhopper on their nets. But there are ways to modify
a 12 inch so you stack two and you basically have the same capability
of a 24 inch roller, but legally it’s a 12 inch. So they’re getting around
the gear restrictions and fishing inside . . . I know [NOAA] wants
to maximize the catch per unit of effort, in which case those [big boats]
are the greatest thing for it. But I think there’s a point where you sort
of have to regulate with a little bit of inefficiency there. Otherwise you’re
catching everything. You’re not letting anything go.
Attentive fishermen describe very specific impacts to fish populations, compared
to monthly migration histories. One gillnetter outlined the seasonal cycle of past
winters:
Usually you can really catch a lot of codfish in December when I
generally start. Then in January it gets a little harder. February is really
slow. By the end of February, beginning of March, the haddock show
up . . . [When] the codfishing dies out . . . I switch over and I go longlining
for haddock.
He described the last year prior to catch shares, when inshore area closures and
days-at-sea limits were still in place:
For all of February and all of March you couldn’t get away from the
codfish. They were everywhere. I never even put my longline gear on that
year. And we could just go out and get 800 [pounds] of cod out of five
nets.
In comparison, only two years later he finds it necessary to set 50 nets to catch fewer
fish. ‘‘You wouldn’t have dreamed of fishing that much gear three years ago.’’ He
notes that the size of the fish decreased, even between the first and second years
of catch shares. With that shift, he lost the ability to fill his quota allocation with
a smaller number of large, high-value fish. He now takes whatever legal fish he
can find.
[That first year of catch shares,] I could have caught my whole allocation
in three weeks if I really wanted to land a ton of fish. But I didn’t. I set
half the amount of gear and only set large mesh gear to bring in large























codfish. It changed so fast. In year two it was so much harder. You
couldn’t use any large mesh gear anymore and catch big fish. You had
to target what was left, the small fish. The whole thing makes me
nauseous.
He went on to describe how the annual migrations seem to have declined:
Now I find, even last year, I was trying to catch my codfish still in
February. Actually right up until the end I was just trying to finish my
allocation. It’s just a struggle. A lot of guys have kind of given up
catching their cod for the year and are just trying to get rid of it now
[by leasing it out to other boats] . . .And then the pollock which are
usually here by Thanksgiving haven’t even shown up yet this year. So
the guys who really rely on those, if they don’t show up here in the next
three weeks, they’re probably not going to show up at all.
While even unfished species populations can fluctuate greatly in abundance and
size composition from one year to the next, another interviewee similarly noted that
haddock has ‘‘become almost nonexistent to our inshore waters in the last few
years.’’ Despite the high market value of landed haddock, quota was trading for
one or two cents a pound because fishermen can’t find enough fish to fill their quota.
Moving Habitat and Gear
Fishermen also observe corresponding changes to fish habitat. One fisherman
explained how different large trawlers are from smaller ones that have long plied
these waters, in the way their fishing gear interacts with rocky seafloor:
The big boats are capable of running up and over these big piles [of
rocks] . . . [M]y friends that are draggers, I tell them, ‘‘Oh, there’s a lot
of fish right where I am; they gotta be right on the edge of your tow.’’
They go, ‘‘Yeah, we can’t get any further to the east’erd.’’ And I can
see that ’cause I scallop also and I see the type of bottom that’s there.
And these big boats have come in and they’ve moved the bottom around,
and now it’s towable bottom. It used to be a nice rock pile, you know,
with boulders scattered . . .And the big boats have gone through there
enough times, and it’s nothing but flat bottom now . . .Basically they’re
snowplowing it; they’re pushing all the good stuff up out of the way.
And that’s habitat; it’s very important.
Fishermen tell these stories in vivid physical detail, although suspended nutrients
lend a dark, opaque color to Northwest Atlantic waters, preventing firsthand view
of the ocean bottom. After decades on the water, they glean constant streams of
ecological information by observing their own gear and catch, and the activities of
other boats (Brewer 2013). One narrated how small trawlers can only fish on smooth
bottom:
I’ve had spots that I jig on and that I longline7 on . . .They’re little areas
of hard bottom that ever since I’ve been fishing it’s been safe from the























draggers. They can only get like a half a mile from me, then the bottom
gets too hard for them to tow over . . .Last year I witnessed the big boats,
they cut that half mile barrier down to a quarter mile, and within two or
three days they were towing right up over the spot. These are big boats,
boats [that] have never, ever in my history of fishing accessed that part of
the bank before . . . going up and over it all the time, and they’re destroy-
ing it. The little boats have never had the horsepower to get up and over
the rocks like that.
He went on to explain how he knows this to be true, reading his sonar depthfinder to
find special places to set out his gear:
I’ve seen it in person. I mean these are tiny little haunts that I fish on that
are like the size of a car or truck. And I’ve seen those places, when you
drive over them and you mark three or four feet up off bottom, I’ve seen
those places completely get annihilated.
One story dates to some years before the area closure opening, but illustrates how
irreplaceable these unseen benthic contours are in the livelihoods of small boat fish-
ermen:
I saw it happen once with a dragger about ten or 12 years ago inshore to
a spot that I specifically named Hog Daddy because that’s what my
sternman that caught a huge cod on the spot and goes ‘‘Hog Daddy!’’
He couldn’t say anything [more]. That spot’s one giant boulder that
got moved, and just completely gone off of the edge.
As trawls drag over the bottom, they collide with any human-made objects
they might encounter. Judging from interactions with fishing gear and shipwrecks,
it seems reasonable to infer that more extensive habitat changes may be happening
concurrently.
[Big boats are] literally towing down the state–federal line, three
miles out. That’s how close they are . . .where a lot of guys lobster.
I know guys lost a ton of lobster traps. And all the inshore wrecks and
hang ups that have been in the same spot forever are now getting towed
and moved everywhere, so even the inshore small draggers are hanging
up and just rimracking their gear in places where they’ve always been able
to tow.
Another owner-operator noted:
There’s this parade of 90-footers going up and down . . . and the gillnets
are going for rides this way and that way and every other way. These guys
are losing a lot of gear.
Some interviewees speculated that benthic changes wrought by large draggers
may have even caused recent drownings. Two 40-odd-foot scallop boats went
down in November and December 2012, the first just two miles from Cape Cod’s























Provincetown, after its gear snagged up on bottom, and the second 12miles from the
same harbor.
The two scallopers lately that one sunk and one tipped over, I wouldn’t
be surprised if they hung up on something that was moved and never
there to begin with. Usually those mobile guys, they don’t stray too far
off their proven tows.
Crew are unlikely to survive a sinking or a capsized boat in the cold water of winter
or early spring, and even less dangerous snags can cost fuel and short daytime work
hours, so most small groundfish or scallop draggers stick to well-known pathways.
As a gillnetter noted:
The small draggers are starting to tear up their gear on a regular basis
where normally they know the bottom like the back of their hand and
don’t have to worry about it.
In addition to concerns about present-day catches, the cost of gear conflicts, and
personal safety, many inshore fishermen are horrified that the long-term future of
the fishery may be at stake. They fear that if they lose their businesses and quota
allocations, a few of the largest firms will end up owning all the quota. In 2011, only
a year into sector management, council staff publicly noted with quiet concern that
three Massachusetts firms owned more than 40% of Georges Bank winter flounder
quota (New England Fishery Management Council 2011). The staff further revealed
that in 2010, 26% of Georges Bank haddock, 18% of Georges Bank yellowtail,
and 21% of Georges Bank cod were each controlled by three firms. More detailed
information on quota ownership and transfer is protected by privacy laws. In
2012, one harvest sector controlled more than half the quota for several species,
and the owner of 11 boats involved in groundfishing publicly announced that he
had $50 million invested in the fishery. Some see history repeating itself, comparing
the present situation to the heyday of foreign fleets 40 years ago, before the FCMA.
Stocks can’t take constant pressure. We went from the rolling closures and
just an inshore fleet, the two coupled together seemed to be working great.
Until all of a sudden it was like the Wild West: no rolling closures and
everybody fishing in one little area. I don’t think the fish stood a chance.
Watch these big boats fish and they line right up, just like the old Russian
pulse fishing8 that sort of got the whole Magnusson Act started.
Pointing Fingers or Seeking Solutions?
Despite feeling profound anger and sadness that a way of life may be slipping away from
their families and home harbors, many inshore fishermen blame the regulatory situation
more than big boat captains, who must respond to owner pressures to maximize profits
on each fishing trip. One small-boat fisherman expressed his ambivalence:
It’s hard because they’re kind of forced to do what they’re doing, so you
can’t really blame them too much. But on the other hand, all that























conservation and all [those] daily limit[s] that all the small boats had to
endure for so many years. And watch the stocks come back: ‘‘Wow this
is great.’’ The ones who really benefitted from that were the ones who
caused the problem to begin with: the big boats. It’s infuriating.
It is true that larger boats have higher fixed and operating costs. Many have less
diversified business histories than small boats, so the firms have fewer income alter-
natives if their groundfish revenues fall. Most of the big boats in the New England
fleet were built using funds and tax breaks provided by the federal government
decades ago, when Congress wished to augment the domestic fleet to replace the
evicted foreign boats. That sudden growth strained previously existing informal
conservation norms and social networks that had long characterized the industry
(Hennessey and Healey 2000; Acheson and Gardner 2011; Brewer 2012). In their
defense, owners of larger boats point out that small boats are also capable of deplet-
ing fish populations. Untended gillnets continually entrap fish, which die or are
eaten by seals if not harvested or released. With the elimination of trip limits, gillnet-
ters may be motivated to set more nets and fill their quota quickly. With more nets,
each might be tended less often. Other possible explanations for groundfish popu-
lation decline have also circulated among scientists and industry members. Among
them, discard rates of trip-limited species prior to catch shares may have exceeded
current estimates. Discretionary handling of new federal data sources and outliers
in existing data sets may have skewed recent population assessments. Climate change
may cause warmer water species migrating northward to compete with resident
species. Seal predation on groundfish may have increased. Imported herring used
as lobster bait may transmit disease. Because most lobstermen can no longer afford
groundfish permits, when they accidentally catch small fish in their traps, they often
spear them as bait (Brewer 2012).
On the other hand, concerns about larger boats seem to be escalating. When
they frequent inshore waters, the risk of collisions with smaller boats and gear rises.
Justified or not, the risk may prevent smaller scale fishermen from speaking publicly
on related issues at the New England Fishery Management Council. While many
owners of large boats have a history of responsiveness to small-boat concerns,
a few have a reputation for ruthlessness, and little incentive to maintain amiable
relationships with small boats. One small-boat owner described his anxiety:
When you’re a little 40-foot boat fishing with four fishing rods and
you’ve got two 90 foot walls of steel on either side of you, [or] as a mobile
gear fisherman, you’re screwed if you have any type of issue.
Entanglement of deployed gear between a large and small trawler, even gear set on
cables extending many meters behind the vessels themselves, can sink the smaller
boat and crew within a matter of minutes.
We call it the first rule of the road: the bigmarch on and the little sink . . . It’s
a nasty dynamic that’s developed. And a lot of times people that have made
statements on the record on this kind of big boat, small boat issue—funny
how you can get chased around the ocean by somebody who tries to tow
you down. Everybody knows what everybody else does, and it has stifled
discussion quite a bit where a lot of people are afraid to speak up . . .You























figure you’re gonna get run down the next day as word spreads among the
large boat fleet that ‘‘hey, he spoke out against us; let’s make his life
miserable.’’ It’s like terrorism . . .You can’t prove it . . . but I’ve seen
it happen. I know it happens . . .When the sun starts to get eclipsed, you look
up and there’s three stories of steel right next to you . . .You can’t outrun
‘em . . .They don’t have to say anything; they don’t have to do anything.
It’s just the idea that I got within 50 feet here, the next time it could be
20. Perhaps you’d better keep your mouth shut when you go to meetings.
Regardless of the intentions of large-boat owners and captains with respect to
fish populations, benthic habitat, and the safety and livelihoods of smaller vessels,
their presence in newly opened areas is perfectly legal because the council and
NOAA allow it. The FCMA includes only weak language on habitat protections,
compared to explicit language guiding the use of population assessments to meet
mandatory species rebuilding timelines and quantitative goals. Most involved
environmental organizations support the concept of catch shares, in part because
they set simple numerical standards by which to evaluate NOAA’s performance,
especially in court. In a November 2012 letter submitted to the council’s Habitat
Committee by the Conservation Law Foundation, a New England-based nonprofit
that spearheaded fisheries conservation litigation in the 1990s, the organization
noted that fishing-gear restrictions under consideration might trigger industry legal
action, because they are not sufficiently supported by peer-reviewed science. Atten-
tion to gear impacts at the Habitat Committee level moves notoriously slowly, and
traction at the council level is not apparent. Similarly, in December 2012
working-group reports, assessment scientists noted that spatialized models of
New England cod populations might prove useful, but also cited studies supporting
the status quo. Uncomfortable with the lack of clear scientific evidence, they instead
awaited further analyses from the council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee. One
member of that committee found council consideration of ecosystem variables to be
‘‘on ice.’’
Not only has the council not devoted time to debate gear, habitat, and fish
subpopulation issues, it has considered opening more closed areas. At a council
meeting in December 2012, a large-boat fleet owner and former council member
voiced the argument in terms of supporting working waterfronts, which are under
gentrification pressure.
We have to mitigate and give the industry every opportunity it can to try to
survive. The best way . . . is to get pounds of fish over the dock. We . . . need
to figure out ways to aggressively target the healthiest stocks we have. If we
do that, it’s my experience in watching this and trying to make this work,
that we will have an impact on the less healthy stocks, in a positive way. In
order to do that, we need to get access to those fish. We don’t have access
to that [more abundant] stock of haddock on a consistent basis. We get it
when it decides to swim out [of a closed area]. We can’t keep our markets
going, we can’t keep the infrastructure going that way. So all we want to do
is get access to the healthiest stocks of fish we have.
He implied that his boats and others would shift effort from depleted fish popula-
tions to previously protected ones that should withstand the harvest pressure. Under























the logic of catch shares, as long as boats do not exceed quota allocations, this is
a fair proposal. Given the preceding observations from boats that have long fished
recently opened areas, however, the prospect of more openings sounds ludicrous.
In response, the council did not immediately open more areas, but designated some
additional areas for access pending approval of individual sector requests by NOAA.
NOAA responded by announcing its willingness to discuss the possibility of opening
some areas (NOAA 2013). Even if the council wished to take emergency action and
restore closures, trip limits, or days-at-sea, it would face legal challenges under the
National Environmental Policy Act, which distinguishes between major regulatory
actions that require public hearing timelines and formal environmental and social
impact assessments, and regulatory adjustments that can be made without dedicated
public review.
The only lasting solution to the fundamental conflict between the logic of
market-based management and the material experience of fishing may lie in amend-
ments to the FCMA to diversify the information streams used by managers and
assessments. Doing so would be fraught with legal complexity, and would necessitate
a level of policy discussion not yet taking place. It would require input from natural
and social scientists with a range of expertise, the breadth of the fishing industry, and
managers. New institutional arrangements would need to accommodate the gener-
ation and use of more integrative bodies of knowledge. Decision makers would have
to concede that catch shares are not a panacea, and do not obviate regulatory
responses to ecological and technological shifts.
Conclusion
Lifelong groundfishermen report detrimental changes in inshore fish populations
and benthic habitat, and a rise of tensions between smaller and larger boats. These
phenomena are not entirely new, but the severity and suddenness of recent reports
correspond with the implementation of market-based catch share policy, and the
removal of other controls such as harvest limits per fishing trip, area closures, and
days-at-sea restrictions. Previously published evidence on catch shares is already
mixed, and this case adds to the list of concerns. Justified or not, accusations abound
among inshore groundfishermen that technological capabilities of the largest boats
exceed ecosystem resilience. With some amount of industry consolidation being
virtually unavoidable under market-based management, and as the standardized
commodity of species quota replaces a broader suite of more materially specific regu-
latory options, concerns arise that any increasing prevalence of larger trawlers could
invite unprecedented ecological damage.
The present article cannot offer decisive evidence that large boats cause ecologi-
cal decline; it aspires only to document qualitative evidence provided by a particular
segment of the industry, one with an interest in future access to a sustainable inshore
fishery. As in any complex socioecological system, a nuanced understanding of fish-
ery resilience can be difficult to discern without intensive field data collection using
a range of methodologies. Instead, catch shares rely on predictive capacities of bio-
economic models uncoupled from the spatial and temporal particulars of human–
environment relationships. Driving fishery assessments focus on readily quantifiable
data about individual species, in relative isolation from quantitative and qualitative
information about the intrinsically linked social and ecological contexts in which
those species live, reproduce, and die.























This case of apparent management failure reveals a dearth of attention to the
spatiotemporal materiality of fishing activity. It seems that our government has cho-
sen to grant a public resource to profit-seeking firms without due consideration of
their physical operations—how they conduct daily business in the marine environ-
ment. Present policy removes knowledge production from the integrative site of lived
human experience. It privileges presumed conservation incentives, profits, and
administrative convenience over conflicting evidence collected by lifelong observers
of the fished ecosystem. Of course industry knowledge is partial, contingent, and
cannot be the sole basis for management decisions. Nonetheless, a substantial body
of lay observation points toward the possibility of long term or permanent damage
to a public trust resource, and may therefore merit more serious public consideration
than it has received thus far.
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Notes
1. The vast majority of New England fishers are male, and most female fishers call themselves
fishermen, so the terms fisherman and groundfisherman are used here.
2. Many interviewees who buy or lease quota have larger financial investments at stake than
at any time in the past. Those investments are at unprecedented immediate risk to the
actions of other boats on the water, other quota holders in quota markets, other sector
members and managers in sector decision processes, and other interests involved in regulat-
ory arenas. To protect confidentiality, I provide only minimal details about each intervie-
wee, such as home port, gear type, fishing experience, or boat size category. I generally
distinguish smaller from larger boats at roughly 70 ft in length, based principally on criteria
offered by fishermen themselves.
3. Trawling is often called dragging, but drags also include gear made of metal rings interlaced
to form net-like bags for harvesting scallops and other shellfish.
4. Fishery management literature borrows the terminology of inputs and outputs from bio-
economic models of industrialized agriculture (Finley 2009).
5. Daily species limits are not a perfect management tool. Like other kinds of catch quotas,
they can lead to the discarding of already-dead fish.
6. Mobile gear is moved by boats, including trawls, drags, and other nets. This contrasts with
fixed gear, which boats set in a one place at a time and includes hooks, gillnets, and traps.
7. Jigs and longlines are hook fishing technologies.
8. While huge harvest-processor vessels from several European and Asian countries fished
within sight of U.S. coasts in the 1970s before ‘‘Americanization’’ of U.S. waters, Cold
War tensions lent particular drama to the frequent presence of Soviet-bloc boats among
them.
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